Our final task is to take over an Escrow contract and refund the money back to the victims who paid.
After completing task 6, the solution of this task is pretty simple.
Let’s recap of what we have learned so far:
- We understand the entire message flow of the ransomware
- We can substitute ransom contracts with our ‘patched’ versions
- We cannot change anything about the Escrow contract itself
- Looks like the attackers have not withdrawn the money from the Escrow
So, what we need to do is:
- Find a flaw in the ransomware blockchain
- Exploit the flow to take the money from the Escrow
- Refund it back to victims
Let’s take a look at the message diagram:
and this method
as well as this one
Looks like the attackers decided to be “Gentlemen” and provided refund option in case they fail to decrypt the encrypted file. Also it looks like the ransom contracts can re-register themselves as many times as they want given that they have been authenticated once by the Oracle.
So let’s modify our ransom contract again to do the following:
- Register with the Escrow as zero ransom contract
- Call payRansom on the escrow giving it 0 ether
- When Escrow calls our requestKey method we will first give a corrupted version of the key to the Escrow and then re-register ourselves as a contract with Ransom amount of 300 ETH.
- Oracle will fail to decrypt and will indicate failure to the Escrow by calling DecryptCallbackMethod with authResult = False
- Escrow receives a failure notification and automatically refunds us. However, because we changed the refund amount at step 3, the Escrow is going to refund us with 300 ETH not zero which we initially paid
This is a blockchain equivalent of going to the store, changing the price sticker to 1 penny, buying the item, tampering with the receipt to make it look like we bought it for $3000, damaging the item, returning it back to the store for the refund of $3000.
Note that operations in step 3 have to be done exactly in this order. This is because registering new ransom contract creates a new contract record in the
victimMap mapping. Which means the Escrow will consider this newly registered contract to be unauthenticated. It will therefore refuse the decryptKey request from the new contract. Doing these operations in the order listed in step 3 seems unreliable, but actually it’s not. We are guaranteed that our substitution of ransom amount is going to happen before the oracle gets the decrypt event by the atomic nature of the Ethereum transactions. All changes to the contracts and posting of the events are made public once the block is acknowledged by the miners.
Here is our test for this scenario [http://bit.ly/2Db5Eu4].
And of course it fails
It fails because we didn’t ‘patch’ our contract yet.
Again we are sticking to the principles of TDD. First we run the test to illustrate the problem. We run this test to make sure it fails, if it doesn’t fail it was not a valid test, we do whatever is needed to make the test pass.
The ‘patch’ for the Ransom contract is here
We run the test again.
And it passes this time.
Let’s check the account balances
Great, we managed to get 9 Ether out of the owner. Even better, because the transfer is done in the context of DecryptCallback, Oracle is paying for the gas.
Now let’s go and use this exploit on the real blockchain.
Note that we transferred only 9 ether except of 300 requested by the assignment. This is because of the default Ganache settings of 100 ether on each account. I have tried to make this walkthrough as simple as possible, but still educational. Changing default ganache settings would make this walkthrough more complex than it already is.
- Go back to RemixIDE and upload our new EvilRansom contract to the workspace.
- Deploy the new contract using the same technique we’ve used in task 6
- Verify that the new contract has deployed by checking blockchain events using our notebook or just call the method getEscrowAddressForVictim of the Registry to verify that new contract has registered correctly
- Once you’ve verified, that the new contract is there. Make a 0 either payment to the escrow and enjoy your 300 ETH refund back.
- In order to get the credit for this task you have to actually send 100 ether to each of the victims who have paid the ransom. Can’t keep to yourself.
- Once you send the ether to the victims, go ahead and submit your escrow contract address to the challenge
Sorry, there are no screenshots for the lasts steps. I am writing this more than a week after completing the challenge. Applying Task 7 exploit to the real blockchain permanently corrupts the Escrow contract so it is not possible to repeat this again.
If you followed me along, you have completed entire challenge. Congratulations!